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his religion behind his back. When Henry Wallace asked Harlan 
Stone in 1943 if Murphy had "grown" in his job, Stone replied "He 
can no more grow than that stone."Jo Justice Roberts and Judge 
Learned Hand referred to him as "the Saint," "St. Francis," or 
"Jesus, Lover of My Soul."JI But the Murphy who emerges in this 
fine biography was a Justice of unusual courage. He took seriously 
his oath to defend the Constitution and did a better job in that re-
spect than any of his colleagues. He was not among those Justice 
Jackson had in mind when he penned the following ditty in 1941: 
Come you back to Mandalay 
And hear what the judges say 
As they talk as brave as thunder 
And then run the other way.32 
ON COURTS AND DEMOCRACY: SELECTED NON-
JUDICIAL WRITINGS OF J. SKELLY WRIGHT. Edited 
by Arthur Selwyn Miller.' Westport, Conn.: Greenwood 
Press. 1984. Pp. xvi, 291. $29.95. 
A "CAPACITY FOR OUTRAGE": THE JUDICIAL OD-
YSSEY OF J. SKELLY WRIGHT. By Arthur Selwyn 
Miller. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1984. Pp. xiv, 
242. $29.95. 
Ernest van den Haag2 
In Arthur Selwyn Miller, Judge J. Skelly Wright found an 
ideal biographer, who shares his understanding, or, I would con-
tend, misunderstanding, of the nature of law and of the role of 
judges. In turn Professor Miller has found an ideal person to write 
the foreword in Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., with whom he shares 
not only a misunderstanding of the function of law, but also a re-
markable inability to command the English language. A few in-
30. Id. at 249. 
31. ld. at 262, 266. 
32. Id. at 263. 
I. Professor Emeritus of Law, George Washington University; Adjunct Professor of 
Law, Nova University Center for the Study of Law. 
2. John M. Olin Professor of Jurisprudence and Public Policy, Fordham University. 
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stances will demonstrate no less. Beyond them, codex ipsus 
loquitur. 
Judge Johnson's first sentence is "It is indeed a pleasure to 
have the opportunity to write about Skelly Wright as a person and 
as a judge to serve as a foreword . . . . " On the same page: "I do 
not remember the details of the discussion made by this young 
.... " Judge Johnson's English does not improve through his 
three-page foreword. On its last page he writes "Judge Wright will 
long be recognized as the role model of how members of our judici-
ary can and should speak truth to power, to require disinterested 
fairness in the face of hysteria . . . . " 
Professor Miller's biography tells us practically nothing about 
Judge Wright's nonjudicial personality or life. Yet the preface be-
gins by declaring that "this book is a personalized view of . . . . " 
His English does not improve through 200-odd pages. Miller ex-
presses his "gratitude ... to [his] wife, Dagmar, who caught many 
of my egregious errors in syntax." He should consider divorce. 
What else is to be done with a wife who approves of "strains . . . 
being leveled against constitutional mechanisms," or again "against 
familiar institutions," who lets him write "[h]uman behavior is too 
complex to be able to label anyone with a single term" or that 
"[j]udges must . . . choose from between these principles"? (He 
means, if you haven't guessed, "among these principles.") It would 
be tedious to give more examples. You have been warned. 
Judge Wright himself usually writes tolerable English, though 
he does accuse people of losing interest "in the practical problem of 
solving racial discrimination." Miller says of Judge Wright that 
"[n]ot having a profound mind, Wright knows what he wants and 
relies upon his clerks ... Wright gives the theme and a clerk ... 
provides the language." Because I do not believe in guilt by associa-
tion, I must be agnostic about Judge Wright's command of English. 
Let me turn now to the substance of the books, beginning with 
Miller's biography. 
I 
The electric chair did not work properly when the state of Lou-
isiana attempted to execute the murderer William Francis. Wright, 
then an attorney in private practice, argued before the Supreme 
Court that a second attempt to execute Francis would constitute 
double jeopardy as well as cruel and unusual punishment. His first 
argument was silly, since Francis was not tried a second time for the 
murder. The second argument conceivably had merit, although one 
may wonder how, when execution is the sentence, the pain and suf-
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fering of an aborted attempt could take its place. The Supreme 
Court rejected the appeal. Francis was executed. 
Miller (and Wright?) insists that it was all Justice Frankfurter's 
fault: his was "the crucial fifth vote in a 4 + 1 = 5 to 4 decision." 
Why single out Frankfurter? I can't see how in a joint decision one 
vote is more "crucial" than another. (Perhaps Miller meant "unex-
pected" when he wrote "crucial." I wouldn't put it past him.) 
Anyway, four-to-four would have been enough to confirm the death 
sentence. But let that go. Miller writes that "[Frankfurter's] con-
currence with the Court majority, rather than being a triumph of 
judgment over feeling, is, when coupled with his subsequent secret 
efforts to get executive clemency for Willie, an example of intellec-
tual dishonesty." This comment strikes me as an example of 
Miller's obtuseness. Justice Frankfurter thought that the law re-
quired him to reject the appeal by Francis. He also felt that Francis 
should be pardoned. The law may require severity. Charity may 
suggest leniency. A pardon (from the French par don-as a gift) is 
something donated, not something deserved or legally due. When 
you give charity you do not imply that the recipient has earned it. 
You follow a feeling of compassion, a charitable impulse. Princes, 
presidents, and governors in most societies can make a gift to a 
criminal of life, or freedom, even when that life, or freedom, is for-
feited by law. A judge, then, may properly decide that statutory or 
constitutional norms require him to allow a sentence of death to be 
executed. Yet the same judge may also feel that in the case at issue 
justice should be (in John Milton's phrase) tempered with mercy. 
He may wish to suggest as much to a governor, who has discretion 
in the matter, and urge him to offer executive clemency to the crimi-
nal. There was no "intellectual dishonesty" in Frankfurter's behav-
ior. There was only a clear and compassionate mind. Miller's 
confusion of justice with charity speaks volumes. As will be seen, it 
is characteristic of Judge Wright as well. 
Miller intimates, correctly I believe, that in Wright's view the 
truly important question about judicial decisions is: cui bono (to 
whose advantage?) The Romans asked that question to point to the 
motive, or interest, of a criminal suspect. A judge, however, was 
not supposed to ask this question about the effect of his sentence on 
the parties. He was to decide what claims were legally justified. I 
wonder whether judges excluding inadmissible evidence and thus, at 
times, freeing rapists and murders, ask cui bono? Should they? Do 
Miller and Wright really want them to? I have not noticed that 
either advocates as much. Wright himself indicates that he judges 
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in favor of social justice; the ultimate end of his decisions should be 
"goodness," which he equates with "justice." 
"Justice," Miller believes, embraces "three conflicting princi-
ples: to each according to his rights; to each according to his 
deserts; to each according to his needs."J He comments that a sam-
pling of Judge Skelly Wright's "opinions and articles reveals that 
his concern for human needs oft-times is at odds with what others, 
on and off the bench, view as rights justice." You can say that 
again. Miller adds that "what a person deserves can be subsumed 
under the rubric of what that person needs." Fiddlesticks. 
Consider a foot race in which the winner is to get a prize of 
$1000. Contestant Arthur is a rich and athletic young man. He 
hardly needs the prize money or the prestige. Contestant Selwyn is 
poor and insecure and needs the prize money to pay for an opera-
tion for his aged mother. Arthur comes in first. According to the 
rules (laws) of the race he deserves the prize although he does not 
need it and Selwyn does need it. (Selwyn moreover is good, Arthur 
wicked.) Since Miller believes that "what a person deserves can be 
subsumed under the rubric of what that person needs" would he, or 
Judge Wright, have decided that Selwyn is the winner, or should get 
the money anyway, because he needs it? 
The criterion of need, far from being able to "subsume" desert, 
is altogether irrelevant to it. Consider another hypothetical case. A 
rich man claims title to some real estate, or to a bank deposit to 
which a very poor and good man claims title as well. Or the 
wealthy man wants some money he lent the poor man to be repaid 
as agreed. Doesn't the law require courts to disregard need, or 
goodness, or cui bono, and to consider only who has a right to the 
land, or money, and accordingly deserves it? Otherwise, why 
shouldn't the judiciary be drawn from other occupations besides 
law? How about social workers? Psychologists? 
Of course, the law can give the needy rights based on their 
needs; it can order that their needs be regarded as deserving some-
thing or other, for instance welfare, to which they then become le-
gally entitled on the basis of their need. But no society is or can be 
organized on the basis that desert is determined simply by need. 
Even Karl Marx advocated need as a criterion of distribution only 
under communism-not under socialism. According to Marxist es-
chatology, only when scarcity is gone can communism be insti-
tuted. 4 Then, and only then, would the criterion of need prevail. 
3. A. MILLER, A "CAPACITY FOR OUTRAGE" 8 (1984) (quoting Dr. David Miller) 
(emphasis in original). 
4. Incidentally, Miller thinks that we have been approaching "the end" of "compara-
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Marx did not confuse the need criterion with justice or desert, being 
smarter, in this respect, than Messrs. Miller and Wrights Almost 
every critic of Marx has pointed out what these two gentlemen 
blissfully ignore. First: if need is the only criterion, achievement 
and merit cannot be rewarded. If they cannot be rewarded, they 
will occur less often. If they occur less often, the poor as well as the 
rich ultimately will suffer. And second: there is no nonarbitrary 
way of determining "needs": Do I need a vacation more than you? 
A car? An apartment? How does one decide? And who should do 
the deciding? 
II 
Let me leave now, not without a sigh of relief, Judge Wright's 
biographer to consider some of his subject's own writings collected 
by Professor Miller under the title A "Capacity for Outrage." Each 
of Judge Wright's essays is briefly introduced by Professor Thomas 
C. Grey. 
In The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society, 
Wright explains his view that "nature abhors a political vacuum," 
which the Court must fill if legislatures do not. The Court should 
"struggle with social issues" (not, nota bene, legal issues). If "no 
one [is] doing [the struggling] at all," then "the judiciary must bear 
[sic] a hand ... in such situations." None of these asseverations is 
argued. Is "nature" a pseudonym of Judge Wright? What is a 
"political vacuum"? (A situation in which the legislature isn't do-
ing the things that Wright wants done?) 
Although he never fully addresses the fact that the role he en-
visages for the Court is legislative, nor the fact that by assuming this 
role, the Court, an unelected body, replaces the elected bodies 
meant to deal with political issues, Skelly Wright has some remark-
able answers to the usual objections to his activist view. These ob-
jections, in the first place, overstress the Court's "immunity from 
democratic processes." How is that? Voters cannot legally oust 
and replace federal judges appointed for life. Wherefore federal 
courts are indeed totally immune from the relevant "democratic 
processes." For the essence of democracy is the ability of voters to 
oust and replace decision makers. The reason for the immunity of 
the courts is that it was thought that their decisions would be tech-
tive . . . abundance" since the sixteenth century. He certainly outdoes Malthus who saw 
something like this in the nineteenth century, and guessed that it will happen. It hasn't yet 
happened although Miller asserts it has been happening for three hundred years. Funny I 
hadn't noticed. 
5. SeeK. MARX, CRITIQUE OF THE GOTHA PROGRAM (1938). 
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nical, like those of an engineer, not political like those of a represen-
tative. It was thought that judges simply were concerned with the 
law-not with needs, or social problems. If they are free to legis-
late, then they should periodically stand for election. They should 
be representative not of the law but of the voters. 
But Judge Wright has another even more remarkable answer 
to critics of judicial activism. "[T]he Congress and the executive 
can annul [the Court's] directives simply by refusing to execute 
them." In other words, Wright tells us that courts can invent laws 
if they like, and that the executive can refuse to enforce judicial 
decisions if it likes. An intriguing view of government by laws, in-
deed of legal government, indeed of any kind of government. Presi-
dent Eisenhower was misguided when, obeying the courts against 
his wishes, he desegregated schools. He should have annulled the 
Court's orders by "refusing to execute them." Can you imagine a 
more lawless jurisprudence? 
Judge Wright also resorts to an odd tu quoque argument. He 
tells us that Congress is not an altogether majoritarian and egali-
tarian institution and thus not quite democratic. It does not repre-
sent the voters on a perfectly egalitarian basis and there are 
seniority rules, filibusters, and other antimajoritarian features. 
Therefore we should not be alarmed by the undemocratic character 
of judicial legislation. This is like saying witch doctors are not per-
fect, but neither are real doctors, so why not choose witch doctors? 
The argument is too frivolous to warrant discussion. 
I am not suggesting that judging is or can be a mechanical pro-
cess. In Riggs v. Palmer,6 for example, existing law seemed to lead 
to the unjust result that a murderer would inherit from his victims. 
Yet the court refused to allow this. It might have been wise for the 
court to accept such an undesirable result in one case, thereby invit-
ing the legislature to change the law. However, the common law 
tradition does give judges some leeway here, and power (absent in 
other legal traditions) to rest their decision on a general principle, 
for instance that no offender should profit from his own wrong. In-
evitably, judges sometimes make law, especially when they are 
called upon to interpret the grand phrases of a constitution. Try as 
they may, they cannot wholly eradicate the influence of their 
prejudices. Even in construing statutes, the distinction between cre-
ating and interpreting law is not always clear. There is a twilight 
zone. But this has never prevented people with normal eyesight 
from distinguishing night and day, or a well-lit area from a dark one 
or, finally, the objects in the well-lit area. However, activist judges 
6. 115 N.Y. 506 (1889). 
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do not interpret law with the equivalent of normal eyesight. For 
them there is only twilight, or night, never day, never a well-lit area, 
particularly when they don't like what is visible to persons who 
have all their senses. They close their eyes and discover constitu-
tional penumbras, or discern in the fog "evolving standards" that 
have evolved in their own minds. They confuse the law that clearly 
does exist with what they find desirable, declaring it eo ipso legal. 
III 
According to Judge Wright, "the Warren Court did not bring 
true democracy to America." I think this is true. We had democ-
racy for quite a while before Chief Justice Warren was born. But 
why does Wright believe it is the function of the courts to "bring 
true democracy to America"? I find no mention of this task, or of 
entrusting it to the judiciary, in the Constitution. If there is such a 
task, isn't it for the voters to accomplish? 
What is Judge Wright's notion of "true democracy"? He is not 
very explicit but seems to believe that democracy involves far more 
egalitarianism than the Constitution requires. Perhaps his remarks 
about the Supreme Court and the younger generation of lawyers 
offer a clue: "An institution [he refers to the Supreme Court] that 
sits back, always emphasizing its weakness and its reasons for inac-
tion, is unlikely to be in a fighting stance when the tanks roll down 
Pennsylvania Avenue." He sees "no point in querulous admoni-
tions that the Court should restrain itself from combatting injus-
tice" because, somehow, these admonitions would make it harder to 
fight the tanks. This incredibly childish idea is characteristic of 
Judge Wright's jurisprudential thought. How would an activist 
court, or any court, be able to fight tanks? Tanks are most likely to 
"roll down Pennsylvania A venue" once the rule of law is dead. If 
that time comes, lawless judges may deserve part of the blame. 
"[N]o amount of experience," Judge Wright avows, "will substan-
tially dull the inspiration of the 1960's." We need scrupulous 
judges, receptive to experience, not judges inspired by the 1960's or, 
for that matter, by anything but the law. 
Judge Wright quotes Anatole France's well-known sarcasm 
about the majestic equality of the law, which prohibits rich and 
poor alike from sleeping under bridges. This, according to Wright, 
shows "the basic fatuousness of the goose-gander approach." What 
it really shows is the fatuousness of Anatole France. Of course a 
law prohibiting stealing bread, or sleeping under bridges, will bur-
den most heavily those motivated to do either, the hungry and the 
poor, and hardly at all those not so motivated, the rich. Similarly, a 
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law prohibiting drinking will burden drinkers, not teetotalers, and a 
law against tax evasion will only burden taxpayers. Is this 
deplorable? The purpose of any criminal law is to restrain those 
tempted to engage in crime. One would have thought that a federal 
judge could be expected to understand that. 
Judge Wright goes on to justify preferential quotas for blacks 
because "we cannot overcome our history of enslaving black[s] ... 
so quickly." Wherefore "I believe hiring quotas for disadvantaged 
minorities no more offend the equal protection clause than does the 
progressive income tax." The progressive income tax is indeed de-
batable. But the debate would be quite irrelevant to quotas. How, 
in Heaven's name, can it be constitutional, let alone morally just, to 
place a white person at a disadvantage for the sake of advancing a 
black one, simply because other white persons in the past placed 
other black persons at a disadvantage? Why does that justify dis-
advantaging a person who had nothing to do with this (and may not 
even indirectly and unintentionally have benefited from it), and ad-
vantaging another, who also was not involved (and may never have 
suffered from past unwarranted discrimination)? 
Judge Wright's answer to such questions is to assert that 
"Brown fully recognizes, to relieve an inequality with respect to the 
Negro was, and is, precisely the purpose of the fourteenth amend-
ment." Wherefore, "recognition of race to relieve an inequality 
[doesn't] violate the fourteenth amendment." He confuses relieving 
an inequality (so as to produce equality), which was indeed the 
point of the fourteenth amendment, at least with respect to some 
inequalities, with reversing it, so as to produce the reverse inequal-
ity. Preferential treatment of racial minorities, apart from being un-
constitutional and immoral, is likely to make the situation worse for 
those meant to be helped by the remedy. You don't make men free, 
or equal, by making them dependent on political handouts. 
According to Professor Miller there "can be no doubt that he 
[Judge Wright] made up the law" in the Hobson v. Hansen7 deci-
sion, thinking that he was thereby serving "social justice." Here 
Professor Miller is right as well as candid. Hobson involved a pub-
lic school "tracking system" instituted in Washington (as well as 
elsewhere) to separate the faster from the slower learners and deal 
with each group in the most appropriate manner. Because the 
tracking system left most blacks on the slow track, Judge Wright 
prohibited it. As a result "white enrollment . . . all but vanished," 
7. 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.C. 1971). 
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that is, schools became more segregated than before and "declined 
in quality." 
Professor Miller opines, in his inimitable fashion, that 
"whether such a ruling [upholding tracking] would have improved 
the Washington schools is highly improbable." But, of course, it 
wasn't the court's business to make the schools better, and certainly 
not to make them worse, as Judge Wright did. The court's only 
business was to determine whether the tracking system was incon-
sistent with the Constitution. Judge Wright in his opinion declared 
that he had to pay heed to "our common need of the schools to 
serve as the public agency for neutralizing and normalizing race re-
lations in this country." What is the legal source of this presump-
tion? Where is the evidence that it is factually accurate? 
It is a common mistake to suppose that a man like Skelly 
Wright, though perhaps gravely flawed as a judge, would make a 
fine Senator. That supposition is true only if we want Senators who 
are addicted to implausible nostrums. Note that the German 
schools, unsegregated for a hundred years, did not prevent the rise 
of anti-Semitism. But the problem in Judge Wright's case is worse 
than unrealistic hopes. This is a judge who believes that, by mixing 
the slow learners with the fast ones, he can help to "neutralize" and 
"normalize" race relations! Does he suppose that slow readers 
learn more if the teacher is trying concurrently to teach the fast 
readers? Does he suppose that this process will reduce racial stereo-
types? That it will lead more white parents to send their children to 
integrated, public schools? Cui bono indeed. 
Judge Wright has had a long career. It will take us a while to 
recover from it. 
